ABSTRACT Ultrasonic sensors are used across a variety of industrial areas, as they measure distance simply via calculating the difference of time between transmission and reception of signals. However, recently, attackers have been targeting ultrasonic sensors to inflict intentional malfunction regarding distance measurement to an obstacle and some researchers have actually demonstrated such attacks using an actual vehicle, the Tesla Model S. In addition, these malicious signal injections into the ultrasonic sensors do not require sophisticated equipment, making it simple to stage a jamming or spoofing attack. This means that, in practice, signal injection attacks on ultrasonic sensors are possible, and, as such, detection of these attacks is crucial. Owing to this possibility, several methods to secure sensors have been proposed. However, these approaches cannot be applied directly to ultrasonic sensors or can operate only in specific, controlled environments. Here we propose an ultrasonic-sensor-specific method that is capable of detecting signal injection attacks without modifying the structural design of the existing environment in which an ultrasonic sensor is applied. Our method is proven to work with a single ultrasonic sensor and also operates when a sensor and/or target are in motion. In addition, we present a mathematical model for detecting maliciously injected signals based on the properties of the sensor system and the relation between signals transmitted and received from the sensor. We evaluate our method using a commercial ultrasonic sensor to demonstrate its efficacy to detect jamming attacks and spoofing attacks under real conditions. Finally, our method does not require additional devices or substantial resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, ultrasonic sensors have been broadly used in many industrial areas thanks to their simple operation and affordable price. These sensors measure the distance to an obstacle via difference of time between the transmission and reception of ultrasonic signals. For example, in the automotive industry, the parking assistant system (PAS) warns drivers to avoid obstacles detected in a blind spot [7] , [12] , [13] . Even in robots and drones, ultrasonic sensors are being used to analyze the surrounding environment [8] , [9] . Because they do not require significant resources, it is expected that ultrasonic
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sensors will be increasingly utilized in even more diversified areas.
Corresponding to the expansion of usage, ultrasonic sensors are now common targets of malicious attacks. By injecting malicious ultrasonic signals, attackers are potentially able to cause an intentional malfunction in a system using ultrasonic sensors. Yan et al. first demonstrated an attack on a vehicle's PAS by jamming or spoofing the ultrasonic sensors so that the vehicle was not able to measure distances to obstacles properly [1] . This indicates that signal injection attacks on ultrasonic sensors have the potential to be actual threats in practice and in military use. Similar attacks can occur in other industrial areas as well where ultrasonic sensors are being used. In fact, even an amateur could inject a malicious signal into an ultrasonic sensor, as information on how to jam ultrasonic sensors is readily available on the Internet [11] . There is another type of attack that causes malfunction on sensors via ultrasonic signal injection [27] . However, these attacks are on accelerometers, and we only consider attacks on ultrasonic sensors using ultrasonic signals for the purpose of this research.
Some researchers have proposed methods to secure sensors against signal injection attacks, among which there are methods that may be applicable to ultrasonic sensors [2] , [3] , [18] - [20] , [22] , [28] , [29] . One category of methods is to use multiple devices. Methods of [2] , [18] use a sensor-fusion algorithm. The sensor-fusion algorithm detects attacks on a single sensor by analyzing data from multiple sensors and detecting an abnormal facet, which becomes an outlier among other data. In other words, a sensor that measures the outlier is determined as being attacked. Because of the mechanism of sensor-fusion algorithm, various types of sensors are required, and all sensors must measure the same type of data. Similarly, there is a method of adopting multiple antennas to secure a signal GPS sensor [19] . Another category is to use a noise pattern that is created during the normal operation of sensor systems [28] , [29] . The method of [28] considers and evaluates two examples: a real-world water treatment and a water distribution testbed. Similarly, the method of [29] is evaluated using ultrasonic sensors that measures a water level in a tank under the condition of measuring the fixed distance between the sensor and the wall. Both methods can only be applied in static situation and not in dynamic situations where the sensor is in motion. Our method considers both static and dynamics situations. And yet another method is to randomize signals [3] , [20] , [22] . The PyCRA method is designed with a challenge-response structure for sensors and can be applied to a single sensor [3] . This method revealed that an attacker can successfully stage a signal injection attack by injecting malicious signals into a target sensor faster than the attack detection rate of PyCRA applied to the target sensor [21] . And recently, the authors of [3] have refuted the method of [21] in [30] . Likewise, tor secure LiDAR, a method of varying signal-transmission period as unpredictable has also been proposed [20] . This method makes it difficult for the attacker to synchronize a malicious signal with an original signal. Recently, a method to enhance the security of ultrasonic sensors for autonomous vehicles has been proposed which is called Physical Shift Authentication, or PSA [22] . This method transmits ultrasonic signals whose frequency, amplitude, duration, or phase fluctuate randomly. By doing this, it is possible to determine whether a received signal is a malicious signal from an attacker or a corresponding signal to the transmitted signals. In Section 8, we will analyze whether those existing methods are applicable to the ultrasonic sensors or not.
In this paper, we propose a method that can be applied to a single sensor without any modifications to the structural design of an existing environment. Our method detects signal injection attacks on ultrasonic sensors by verifying a received signal based on sensor system properties and the relation between transmitted and received ultrasonic signals. We also provide the mathematical model that serves as the base of our method and evaluate it with the commercial ultrasonic sensor. Our contributions are as follows: a) Our method is able to detect signal injection attacks (i.e., jamming and spoofing attacks). Here, spoofing attacks include not only advanced but also simple attack ways. b) Our method can detect attacks not only on static situations but also in dynamic environments where ultrasonic sensors or obstacles are in motion and various obstacles exist. c) We present a mathematical model of the relation between i) how long an ultrasonic sensor is triggered to transmit an ultrasonic signal, ii) the distance to an obstacle, and iii) the radiation angle of the ultrasonic sensor. Accordingly, our method verifies the integrity of ultrasonic signals based on this mathematical model. d) Because it is based on an ultrasonic sensor system model, OEM of ultrasonic sensors can easily apply our method to other types of ultrasonic sensors differing from the model demonstrated in this paper. e) Our method can be applied regardless of whether the existing environment is single or multi-sensor, as it can be applied even to a single sensor.
II. BACKGROUND
An ultrasonic sensor consists of two transducers: a transmitter and a receiver. Transducers divided into two types according to how they operate in the air [23] . The first one is an electrostatic transducer. The electrostatic transducer consists of two plates, one of which is immovable and the other is movable. When a high voltage signal is applied to both plates, the plates are pulled toward each other via the principle of electrostatic attraction. This induces impulses and generates ultrasonic signals in the air. However, this type is difficult to apply to a general system because of its large volume and high price. The other type is a piezoelectric transducer, which uses some material with a piezoelectric effect. The piezoelectric effect is when applied pressure or vibration (i.e., mechanical energy) generates electricity and vice versa. Thus, ultrasonic signals can be generated using this phenomenon. Since this type of transducer allows for the use of simple control electronics, it is widely used in a number of common devices such as robots, vehicles, and drones, and so we will only consider this type of transducer. When the electricity is applied to the transmission transducer (i.e., transmitter) of an ultrasonic sensor over a fixed period of time, the transmitter generates and emits an ultrasonic signal. We denote electricity applied to the transmitter as a trigger and the period of applying the trigger as the duration of triggering. It is noted that the transmitter continues to oscillate and emit an ultrasonic signal, even after the trigger is stopped. This additional oscillation time, called ringing time, is caused by the mechanical resonance 1 of the transducer. As shown in Figure 1 , even after the trigger is applied to the transmitter for 1000µs and stopped, an ultrasonic signal is still generated. As a result, the ultrasonic signal is transmitted during not only 1000µs and but also throughout the ringing time. The trigger and ultrasonic signals are acquired by an oscilloscope [18] . The transmitted ultrasonic signal propagates with a certain radiation angle and its shape of propagation is called a beam pattern of the ultrasonic sensor. Figure 2 shows the general model of the beam pattern [4] . The angle of beam θ 0 (i.e., radiation angle) can be expressed as
where λ is the wavelength of the ultrasonic signal and r is the radius of the transmitter. The ultrasonic sensor transmits ultrasonic signals periodically. This operation is usually performed over a fixed time interval in the case of vehicles or drones [22] . When the transmitted ultrasonic signal reaches an obstacle, this signal is reflected back to the reception transducer 1 The tendency of a mechanical system is to respond at greater amplitudes when the frequency of its oscillations matches the system's natural frequency of vibration (i.e., its resonance frequency or resonant frequency) than it does at other frequencies. (i.e., receiver). This reflected signal is called an echo signal. The ultrasonic sensor filters the echo signal to remove noises and amplify the signal. Because of the power-attenuation property, signals are attenuated corresponding to the distance over which the signal travels. The filtered and amplified signal is digitized based on a pre-defined threshold to obtain a square pulse, or a normalized signal. For amplification, either a variable gain or a fixed gain is used. For a variable gain, the signal is amplified in proportion to the distance travelled by that signal, while, for a fixed gain, the signal is amplified by a pre-defined constant. This entire process occurs in the ultrasonic sensor's internal circuitry as illustrated in Figure 3 . Moreover, the relation between input (i.e., duration of triggering) and output (i.e., square pulse) can be represented as a system model [5] . Our model is constructed based on this system model, which is explained further in Section 5.
Finally, the distance between the ultrasonic sensor and an obstacle is measured by time of flight (ToF). ToF refers to the difference in time between the time when the ultrasonic sensor begins to transmit ultrasonic signals and the time when the ultrasonic sensor first receives the echo signal. It is noted that the operation time for a square pulse from an echo signal is negligible. Accordingly, the ultrasonic sensor is only able to measure the shortest distance to an obstacle. For ToF t 0 (s) and speed v(m/s) of ultrasonic signals in the air, the distance d(m) is measured as follows:
Additionally, there is also a minimum distance and a maximum distance that the ultrasonic sensor can measure. The ultrasonic sensor is not able to measure the distance during the triggering and ringing time which is the period that signals are transmitted (i.e., blank window). And if the echo signal comes from afar, its amplitude is too low, even when amplified, and the sensor cannot detect the signal. Therefore, the range of distance that the sensor can measure occurs because of these reasons.
III. ATTACK MODEL
The goal of attackers is to cause intentional malfunction of an ultrasonic sensor. These attackers are capable of injecting malicious ultrasonic signals at a distance from the target ultrasonic sensor. Through these injections, the ultrasonic sensor becomes distracted such that it is rendered unable to measure the correct distance to an obstacle. In this case, vehicles have a possibility of collision into obstacles or inability to park properly. In this same way, drones also can fall suddenly.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that attackers cannot physically access the target ultrasonic sensor and alter it. Also, we do assume that these attackers know how to detect signal injection attacks applied to the target sensor and do not want to be exposed to the target, which means that they want to attack without being noticed.
A. ATTACKER TYPE
Ultrasonic sensors periodically transmit an ultrasonic signal and receive a reflected signal (i.e., echo signal). The distance is measured based on the difference of time between the signal-transmitted time and the first echo signal-received time. Thus, attackers need to inject malicious ultrasonic signals within a specific time period during which the target sensor is waiting for the echo signal (i.e., valid period). That is, malicious signals must reach the target sensor before the echo signal arrives.
Based on this, we classify attackers into two types depending on whether the attacker knows about the time interval that the target sensor transmits ultrasonic signals: ignorant and knowledgeable attackers.
1) IGNORANT ATTACKER
An ignorant attacker has no knowledge about the time interval of the target sensor transmitting ultrasonic signals, so is not privy to the exact timing needed to inject malicious signals. Due to this ignorance, this type of attacker either injects malicious ultrasonic signals to the target sensor continuously or over a short time interval periodically. Some signals which is transmitted over short time intervals can succeed in spoofing the distance when successfully injected within the valid period. However, this attacker cannot be sure whether the target sensor has been spoofed as his desired distance.
2) KNOWLEDGEABLE ATTACKER
A knowledgeable attacker injects malicious ultrasonic signals at a precise, deliberate time. In other words, this type of attacker knows the periodic time when the target sensor begins to transmit ultrasonic signals and the valid period for which the target sensor waits for the echo signal. Based on this, the knowledgeable attacker is able to calculate exactly when to inject malicious ultrasonic signals. For instance, if the attacker wants to spoof the distance as d and knows the time t when the target sensor starts to transmit ultrasonic signals, the attacker can transmit malicious signals at time t + (2d )/v, where v is a speed of the ultrasonic signal in the air. Thus, it affords the attacker the ability to forge the distance as desired.
B. ATTACK SCENARIOS
Now we introduce three types of attack scenarios in which intentional malfunction of ultrasonic sensors is inflicted by either an ignorant or a knowledgeable attacker. These scenarios depend on how malicious ultrasonic signals are injected. 
1) DISABLING DISTANCE MEASUREMENT (JAMMING)
An attacker enables ultrasonic sensors to stop measuring distance by simply transmitting strong ultrasonic signals to the target sensor on a continuous basis. This kind of attack is called a jamming attack. Since this attack can be carried out without any knowledge of the target sensor's transmissiontime interval, both ignorant and knowledgeable attackers can do accomplish a jamming attack with relative ease. Figure 4 (a) illustrates when an attacker transmits strong ultrasonic signals to the target sensor, thus making the target sensor unable to measure distance properly, as it is rendered unable to distinguish the original echo signal from the maliciously injected signal. In detail, the distance to the obstacle is calculated as infinite or zero, depending on how the target sensor removes noise. If the ultrasonic sensor recognizes the continuously received ultrasonic signal as noise and removes it, the distance is measured as infinite. In contrast, when the ultrasonic sensor recognizes it as an echo signal and not as noise, the distance is measured as zero. For example, a jamming attack on the ultrasonic sensor can create conditions for an accident to occur by allowing the vehicle to continue to move even if there are obstacles in front of the vehicle or a vehicle in front brakes suddenly.
2) MALICIOUS DISTANCE REDUCTION (SPOOFING)
An attacker may also forge a distance shorter than the original distance to an obstacle, known as a spoofing attack. To forge the distance, a malicious ultrasonic signal must arrive prior to the original echo signal, as shown in Figure 4 (b). Depending on how the attacker injects malicious ultrasonic signals, there are two ways this can be accomplished: simple and advanced spoofing attacks.
Simple Spoofing. Figure 5 illustrates the simple spoofing attack in which an attacker is able to reduce distance maliciously. The long blue and red bars indicate the time that the target sensor and attacker begin to transmit ultrasonic signals, respectively. Additionally, the short blue bar also indicates the time when the target sensor receives the original echo, and the red represents the time it receives malicious ultrasonic signals. We assume that the attacker is located in front of the target sensor as distance d. Since the attacker exists physically, the target sensor would measure the distance as d (i.e., the target sensor recognizes the attacker as an obstacle). Thus, the target sensor begins to transmit an ultrasonic signal and, in turn, receives an original echo signal 2d/v times later. If the attacker transmits the signal in front of the target sensor, then the malicious signal is received only after d/v time. As a result, when the attacker transmits the signal over a short time interval, the probability that the target sensor will receive the malicious signal within the valid period increases, as the time it takes for the malicious signal to travel is shorter than the travel time for the original echo signal. Figure 5 illustrates a scenario in which the first malicious signal transmitted by the attacker is not received within the valid period. However, as time passes, malicious signals are able to reach to the target sensor before the original echo signal, which is represented in the yellow boxes in Figure 5 . As a result, the distance becomes forged as a shorter value through this simple attack method.
In short, a simple spoofing attack to reduce distance maliciously is the transmission of malicious signals over short time intervals. Transmitting signals over short time intervals, more likely than not, results in malicious signal injection before the original echo signal reaches the target sensor. Even if this happens only once, an attacker can spoof the shorter distance. However, this approach cannot guarantee that the forged distance will be the value that the attacker wants. This kind of attack can be accomplished by both ignorant and knowledgeable attackers. Ignorant attackers, though unable to calculate the exact time to transmit malicious signals and therefore unable to forge a distance as they desire, can simply transmit signals repeatedly over a short time interval and eventually succeed in a spoofing attack.
Advanced Spoofing. A more complicated approach to reducing the distance maliciously is to inject malicious signals to the target sensor at an exact time and forge a desired distance. This kind of attack can only be executed by knowledgeable attackers, because they are able to calculate the transmission time for malicious signals based on the target sensor's transmission time interval.
There is one more type of attacker who can forge a distance longer than the original distance, but the success rate of this kind of attack is low and the risk of exposure for the attacker is high. An explanation about this is discussed in Section 7.
IV. OUR PROPOSED METHOD
Our method is designed to detect a signal injection attack on an ultrasonic sensor by verifying whether or not a received signal corresponds to a signal transmitted by a target sensor or an attacker. As mentioned in Section 2, it is noted that the received ultrasonic signal is converted into a square pulse, which has a measurable width. For our method, we first estimate the valid width range of the square pulse and then verify if the measured width of the square pulse is within the estimated valid width range. If not, the received signal is determined as a malicious ultrasonic signal transmitted by an attacker.
The valid width range of the square pulse can be estimated based on three inputs: i) how long an ultrasonic sensor is triggered (i.e., duration of triggering), ii) the distance to an obstacle, and iii) the beam pattern of the ultrasonic sensor. The valid width of the square pulse is estimated through the first and second inputs. Then, by the third input, the valid width range is determined. The relation between each input and the width of the square pulse can be represented in a mathematical model. Therefore, based on this mathematical model, we can estimate the valid width range, which is explained in more detail in Section 5. Our method operates as follows:
1. An ultrasonic sensor begins to transmit an ultrasonic signal at a random time within a fixed time window and is triggered to transmit the ultrasonic signal for a certain period of time called as the duration of triggering. 2. The duration of triggering is randomly selected between two values. It its noted that the two values are dependent on the ultrasonic sensors. For the HG-B40C used in this paper, 200µs and 1000µs have been assigned two values. Subsequently, during the selected duration, the ultrasonic sensor is triggered to transmit an ultrasonic signal. 3. After the transmitted signal is reflected back to the ultrasonic sensor, the ultrasonic sensor measures the distance to an obstacle based on the time of receiving the square pulse. The width of the square pulse is also measured at this time. 4. Based on the three inputs including the duration of triggering, the measured distance, and the beam pattern, the ultrasonic sensor estimates the corresponding valid width range of the square pulse based on the mathematical model. We will present the mathematical model in Section 5. 5. The received ultrasonic signal is verified by comparing the measured width and the estimated valid width (i.e., whether the measured width is within the estimated valid width range). If it is determined as outside the range, the received signal is considered as a malicious signal. It is known that randomization of the signal-transmission time is one way to prevent malicious signal injection attacks [20] , in reference specifically to spoofing attacks. In fact, this is a countermeasure for LiDAR, but can be applied to the ultrasonic sensor as follows. By varying transmission time non-predictably, it becomes more difficult for the attacker to synchronize with the original signal, making it possible to prevent more spoofing attacks. However, even though time to transmit the signal is set at random, the attacker still can forge the distance through the simple spoofing. Because of the blank window, the target sensor cannot arbitrarily choose the starting time value to transmit the ultrasonic signal. That is, the target sensor can only choose the starting time value after the blank window has passed. Apart from this, the attacker is not limited in choosing the signal transmission interval because they only need to transmitand not receive-the signal. Therefore, the attacker can transmit ultrasonic signals over time intervals that are relatively short, and this suggests that malicious signals are more likely to arrive earlier than the original echo signal, as set out in Figure 6 . Consequently, the ultrasonic sensor measures the distance shorter than the original distance, where the sensor detects an obstacle that does not actually exist.
In contrast to this, our method leverages not only randomizing signal-transmission intervals but also verifies measured widths with estimated valid width ranges based on a mathematical model. In order to bypass our method, the attacker would first need to predict the duration of triggering between two values (i.e., 200µs and 1000µs), and the distance to be forged. However, the probability of predicting duration of triggering is 50% and, most importantly, the forged distance is not what the attacker wants and even the attacker does not know. As a result, the target sensor estimates the valid width range based on the forged distance. This induces that the width of the square pulse, which will have been converted from a malicious signal, is unlikely to be within the estimated valid width range. Consequently, the attacker can be detected by our method.
V. MATHEMATICAL BASIS
Our method detects signal injection attacks by verifying whether the width of the received ultrasonic signal is within the estimated valid width range, as mentioned in Section 4. In this section, we present a mathematical model used to estimate the valid width range based on three inputs: i) the duration of triggering, ii) the distance to an obstacle, and iii) the beam pattern of an ultrasonic sensor. With this estimated valid width range, it can be verified whether the received signal is malicious or not.
To begin, the amount of transmitted ultrasonic signal depends on how long the ultrasonic sensor is triggered, and thus, the amount of echo signal also depends on the duration of triggering. Secondly, the amplitude of the echo signal is affected by the power-attenuation property along the distance to the obstacle. The larger the echo signal amplitude is, the larger the amplitude value becomes in comparison with the threshold. Therefore, the longer the duration of triggering and the closer the distance to the obstacle is, the larger the width of the square pulse to be converted becomes. This relation can be represented as the system model [5] . Based on this system model, we can estimate the valid width of the square pulse. Lastly, the width differs depending on the beam pattern of the ultrasonic sensor, as its beam pattern creates a multi-echo phenomenon. The multi-echo phenomenon is a phenomenon in which an ultrasonic signal is continuously reflected. As shown in Figure 7 (a), if the obstacle is narrow, the receiving amount of the echo signal is the same as the amount of transmitted ultrasonic signal. However, Figure 7 (b) illustrates occurrence of a multi-echo phenomenon. If the obstacle is wider than the area that the beam pattern can cover, the transmitted ultrasonic signal is continuously reflected by a distance added to the case of Figure 7 (a). As this continuous reflection increases the receiving amount of the echo signal, so that the width of the square pulse becomes larger. It is noted that the additional distance is the maximum distance at which an ultrasonic signal can travel more because of the beam pattern.
Accordingly, the beam pattern of the ultrasonic sensor creates continuous reflection of a transmitted signal, and how much continuous reflection occurs is depends on how wide the obstacle is. The shapes of obstacles that the ultrasonic sensor may face are various and unpredictable, so we define lower and upper bounds of valid width under normal situations in our method. Therefore, the ultrasonic sensor can detect a signal injection attack by verifying only whether the measured width is within the valid width range, regardless of obstacles encountered. 
A. ESTIMATION FOR LOWER BOUND
To define the lower bound of valid width, we set a reference obstacle that represents the narrowest plane that is still detectable. The size of this obstacle depends on the performance of the ultrasonic sensor. We assume that the reference obstacle induces no multi-echo phenomenon as shown in Figure 7 (a), because the additional distance caused by the beam pattern is negligible.
To estimate the lower bound of valid width, we first model an envelope signal of the received signal (i.e., echo envelope signal) according to the duration of triggering and measured distance. The envelope signal is a curve outlining the positive peaks of the signal. The echo envelope signal corresponding to the duration of triggering and the measured distance can be represented by a second-order linear time-invariant (LTI) system [5] . 2 The estimated echo envelope signal is divided into two parts. If the trigger starts at t 0 and ends at t 1 , and the measured distance is d, the first part of the echo envelope model is represented as follows:
where ω n is a resonant frequency 3 of a sensor and K (d) is a parameter that includes the amplitude of the trigger, the gain due to the sensor itself, and the amplification gain of the sensor. The second part of the echo envelope model is represented as follows:
Thus, the estimated echo envelope signal is:
Further, the width of the square pulse is measured from the estimated echo envelope signal x (t) based on a threshold α by
, where x 1 (T 1 ) ≥ α and x 2 (T 2 ) ≥ α. The threshold α is the same value as the one used for the square pulse, converted from the received ultrasonic signal (i.e., echo signal). Accordingly, T 2 −T 1 becomes the lower bound of the width. 2 A system modeled as linear two-dimensional differential equations satisfying independence of system output over time. 3 A frequency at which the response amplitude is a relative maximum. 
B. ESTIMATION FOR UPPER BOUND
To estimate the upper bound of the valid width, we consider an obstacle that is a flat plane because this obstacle can maximize additional distance. It is noted that the obstacle of the flat plane can even a wall that exists around us. Thus, the upper bound can be estimated as a sum of the lower bound and additional round-trip time. The additional round-trip time is the total time that the transmitted signal travels along the additional distance. Let d be the distance to the flat plane measured by the ultrasonic sensor and θ m be the maximum-reflection angle on the flat plane. This maximum-reflection angle is the maximum angle that can be received by the sensor after being reflected back to the flat plane. This angle is less than or equal to the angle of beam θ 0 of the sensor and it is noted that angle θ m differs depending on the types of sensors.
Finally, the additional distance d is computed as:
Also, the additional round-trip time T corresponding to the additional distance d, is computed as:
Therefore, the upper bound is estimated as:
In fact, the upper bound can be reduced. We have estimated additional round-trip time in terms of the analog echo signal and set the upper bound based on this, as shown in Figure 8 . However, to detect attacks, the width of the square pulse is measured, which is a converted measurement from the analog echo signal based on the threshold. This indicates that the actually measured width of a flat plane obstacle may be smaller than the estimated upper bound. When estimating the upper bound of the width, it does not matter if the measured width is smaller than the estimated width. Furthermore, the difference is small enough to be determined insignificant. Thus, for the simplicity of the model, we employ the additional round-trip time and not the width of the converted square pulse. 
VI. EVALUATION A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we describe the experimental setup for the evaluation of our method. Table 1 shows the equipment we used and their specifications. The sensor HG-B40C that we used provides outputs not only of a signal for measuring a distance, but also of a square pulse-which is converted from an echo signal-and thus we can measure the width of the square pulse. However, there are some sensors that do not provide outputs of the square pulse, like HC-SR04 [26] . For these types of sensors, we can create an interface by soldering corresponding circuits to the receiver. The maximum reflection angle θ m and resonant frequency ω n were determined experimentally in our evaluation as 0.23 rad and 8,000Hz, respectively, because the specification of HG-B40C does not provide those constants. In addition, the duration of triggering was selected at random between two values: 200µs and 1,000µs. The transmission of ultrasonic signals also starts at random; the time interval to transmit ultrasonic signals is randomly selected from 0.1s to 0.3s as a unit of 0.005s. With respect to a reference obstacle, we constructed a narrow foam board 5cm in wideness that can be detected by the ultrasonic sensor used during evaluation. In the reference obstacle, it is expected that multi-echo does not occur. On the other hand, we use a flat plane wall longer than 3m to maximize multiechoes. Finally, the function of pulsein() function was used to measure the width of the square pulse on the Arduino board.
We performed a total of 300 distance measurements during a signal injection attack. Based on the data, we evaluated our method using both a false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) as follows.
• FPR: when an attack signal is considered valid • FNR: when a valid signal is considered malicious Additionally, we accepted measured distances with an error of 5cm from the original distance. This is because the sensor can erroneously measure distances even when there are no signal injection attacks. This indicates that the attacker can forge a distance of 5cm or less form the original distance and still succeed. However, this type of spoofing is rather meaningless, so attacks that forge relatively insignificant differences in distance are not considered to be successful attacks, even if our method misses detecting the attack.
B. LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS ESTIMATION
Next, we evaluate the mathematical model from which lower and upper bounds for the width of the square pulse are estimated. We place HG-B40C in front of the reference obstacle and the flat plane wall, and we obtain widths of the square pulse detected by Arduino through Arduino serial communication. When the distance to the reference obstacle from the sensor is 0.5m, Figure 9 shows analog echo signals, square pulses, and its echo envelope models corresponding to two duration of triggering values, 200µs and 1,000µs. From the echo envelope models, the upper bound of the width is estimated based on the maximum reflection angle θ m , as mentioned in Section 5. We found that the HG-B40C has a maximum-reflection angle of approximate 13 • (0.23 rad). Table 2 and Table 3 show the estimated lower and upper bounds when durations of triggering are 200µs and 1,000µs, respectively.
As can be seen in the Table 2 and 3, averages of measured widths do not always fall between the lower bound and the upper bound. This is because the surfaces of the reference obstacle and the flat plane were considered smooth under ideal conditions when we estimated the lower and upper bounds of the width. However, in reality, there is an error due to the roughness of real surfaces, which results in diffused reflection. The diffused reflection shows that the actually measured width is not within the estimated valid width range (i.e., lower and upper bounds) since the amount of received signal can be reduced or increased. This error is small enough to be tolerated and can be addressed by extending the interval as follows:
Through the experiment, we found that α of 0.08(ms) is effective in detecting signal injection attacks. In the following evaluations, we will use these new bounds to detect signal injection attacks. Figure 10 illustrates the new bounds of the width and all widths measured by Arduino, according to distance and duration of triggering.
C. JAMMING
To simulate a jamming attack on an ultrasonic sensor, we used HG-B40Cs, one of which becomes a target sensor and the other an attacker. First, we placed the target sensor in front of the flat plane wall at 0.7m or 1.3m. Second, we attached the attacker to the wall part, positioned at a straight-line distance from the target sensor. Finally, we set the attacker to transmit ultrasonic signals continuously. The corresponding malicious signals can be transmitted by continuing to give the trigger without using the function of delay() function of the Arduino board.
The distance between the target sensor and the flat plane wall (i.e., attacker) measured at 0.7m or 1.3m, but the target sensor always measured the distance as 119.25m; moreover, the width of the square pulse was measured as zero. This is because the target sensor measures surrounding noise before receiving echo signals, and the continuous and strong signal is considered as noise such that the target sensor recognizes all signals including malicious ultrasonic signals as noise and then removes them. Accordingly, the measured width must be zero when a jamming attack occurs. Since zero is outside the estimated interval of the lower and upper bounds, a jamming attack is detected by our method.
D. SPOOFING
As mentioned in Section 3, it is assumed that attackers are already aware of signal injection attack detection methods which are applied to the target sensor. In other words, attackers know that our method involves: i) time to begin transmitting the ultrasonic signal is chosen at random, ii) duration of triggering is also chosen at random between two values (i.e., 200µs and 1,000µs) and iii) the received signal is verified based on the estimated valid width range. Because the start of transmission of ultrasonic signals is randomly determined in our method, it is difficult for the attackers to predict when the target sensor begins to transmit ultrasonic signals. Therefore, an advanced spoofing attack to forge the distance cannot be executed even by a knowledgeable attacker. This suggests that our method prevents knowledgeable attackers from performing advanced attacks. For simple attacks where the distance is forged shorter than the original distance, the experimental environment is the same as that of the jamming described above, save for the transmission approach. We set the attacker to inject malicious signals whose duration of triggering is fixed as 200µs or 1,000µs, because it is more advantageous for attackers to fix a duration of triggering instead of choosing between two values randomly, and transmit the malicious signals corresponding to it. On the other hand, we do not need to consider the amplitude of malicious signals to be injected, which may affect the width of the square pulse, because HG-B40C supports variable amplification. With respect to time interval to transmitted signals, malicious signals should be frequently injected. Since the frequent transmission increases the probability that a malicious ultrasonic signal may be successfully injected within the valid period, we transmit ultrasonic signals at every 0.01s. Figure 11 illustrates the results of a distance reduction attack in which the target sensor selects the duration of triggering with the same value (i.e., 200µs) as the attacker and distance to the target sensor is 1.3m. Table 4 shows the error rates in detection of distance reduction attack.
As can be seen in Table 4 , FPR becomes larger as the distance between the target sensor and the attacker increases. This is because the longer the distance between them, the longer the validity period which malicious signals can be injected within. However, since the error rates in Table 4 represents the results of each verification, the total error rate would be greatly reduced. In fact, a distance reduction attack occurs over a duration of at least a few seconds.
Accordingly, to succeed in a spoofing attack, every malicious signal injected from the attacker for even a few seconds must be verified as valid. If verification is completed approximately 25 times for 5s, the probability of all 25 false positives occurring consecutively is 0.0481. Moreover, our method generated an FNR of 0 in every case during the experiment. Since the valid width range is estimated based on the mathematical model as mentioned in Section 5, the valid signal cannot not be considered malicious. Thus, the attack can be detected even with just a single alarm, which leads to our conclusion that our method is successful in detecting cases of malicious distance reduction.
E. MOVING SENSOR
We also considered a situation in which a sensor is in motion. The frequency of an ultrasonic signal changes due to the relative speed of an obstacle caused by the movement of the sensor. This phenomenon, the Doppler effect, eventually changes the width of the received signal. Therefore, we estimate a new width that is affected by the Doppler effect.
When the frequency of an ultrasonic signal is 40kHz and the sensor moves toward an obstacle at a relative speed of 15km/h [24] , [25] , the frequency of an echo signal alters by 0.48kHz. Thus, the new widths can be estimated from the actual widths shown in Tables 2 and 3 Tables 2 and 3 . As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6 , the widths affected by the Doppler effect are also within new bounds (i.e., lower and upper bounds extended by 0.08(ms)). Therefore, our method is free from FNR and works well when ultrasonic sensors or obstacles move at a relative speed of 15km/h.
We also performed signal injection attacks on a moving sensor. The attacker is attached to the flat wall and performing signal injection attacks. First, the target sensor is located at a distance 1.7m from the flat wall, the sensor moves forward at a constant speed (approximately 0.4m/s) until the distance reaches 0.5m. The sensor then moves back at the same speed until it is 1.7m from the wall. We repeatedly moved the sensor. Moreover, we needed a reference distance for calculating FPR and FNR. Since the speed is constant and the distance linearly changes, we are able to easily estimate a distance. As a result, we determine the actual distance between the sensor and the wall, and we can calculate FPR and FNR.
For jamming attacks, the target sensor does not work properly, and corresponding widths are also detected as invalid, which is similar to the case of a stationary sensor. For the distance reduction attacks, Table 7 shows the error rates in detection of attacks on the moving sensor. As can be seen in Table 7 , the possibility of successfully completing the attacks for 5s is 2.5280e-11, which is negligible. Therefore, our method is capable of accurately detecting jamming and spoofing attacks even when the target sensor is in motion.
VII. DISCUSSION A. ESTIMATION OF VALID WIDTH RANGE FOR AN ATTACKER
In the case of a simple spoofing attack that the distance is forged to be shorter than the original distance, the attacker cannot know whether the resulting forged distance is as what he intends. Therefore, the attacker cannot estimate a valid width range corresponding to the forged distance and cannot transmit malicious signals that are able to bypass the verification of width.
B. MALICIOUS DISTANCE EXTENSION (SPOOFING)
Not only forging the distance shorter than the original distance but also forging the distance longer than the original distance should be discussed. When an attacker removes the echo signal and then injects an ultrasonic signal to a target sensor, the target sensor receives the malicious ultrasonic signal later than the time the echo signal originally arrives. As a result, the distance is measured longer than the original distance. There are two ways to remove the real echo signal: transmitting an ultrasonic signal whose phase is opposite the real echo signal [15] and using a sound absorbing material [14] . The first method induces a superposition of a real echo signal and malicious ultrasonic signal, making the phase of the real echo signal zero. However, it is very difficult to transmit the malicious ultrasonic signal at the exact time in consideration to the phase of the real echo signal, which indicates that the high-performance resources would be required to accomplish this type of attack [1] . The second one is to remove the real echo signal by using sound-absorbing material. However, this scenario is not within the bounds of our assumption, which states that attackers do not have physical access.
VIII. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING APPROACHES
In this section, we analyze the most relevant approaches applicable to securing ultrasonic sensors.
A. CATEGORY OF USING MULTIPLE DEVICES
The methods based on a sensor-fusion algorithm [2] , [18] assume that the attacker cannot successfully complete an attack by injecting malicious signals into all sensors. Similarly, the method of [19] is to prevent attacks by using multiple antennae to make it difficult for the attacker to spoof the GPS sensor.
When these methods are applied to an ultrasonic sensor, multiple ultrasonic sensors each consisting of a transmitter and a receiver can be used to secure one ultrasonic sensor. In fact, all vehicles contain the conditions of this environment.
First, if each sensor transmits ultrasonic signals independently to measure distance, an attacker can inject malicious signals to all sensors thanks to beam pattern of the sensor. This presents some contradictions to assumptions set out in [2] , [18] . Second, when each sensor transmits ultrasonic signals in order, the rest of the sensors besides the ultrasonic signal-transmitting ultrasonic sensors do not measure distance. This is because that sensor does not measure distance based on the time that other sensors begin to transmit ultrasonic signals. Thus, in effect, this is like having only one ultrasonic sensor.
There are other ways to use multiple ultrasonic sensors that consists of one transmitter and multiple receivers as in [19] . In this case, the attacker can be localized through the difference in time each receiver receives an echo signal after the transmitter sends a signal. However, this type of receivers must always be able to accept ultrasound signals at all times, which may require modification to the structural design of the existing environment.
B. CATEGORY OF RANDOMIZING SIGNALS
The method outlied in [3] , which is called PyCRA, presents a challenge-response structure that is applicable to an active sensor which are sensors that transmit and receive their own signals. The transmitted signal is driven to zero during a random period, and this period is called a challenge. After the signal returns, the sensor verifies whether or not the corresponding property to the challenge is included in the received signal. The received signal is referred to as the response. If the corresponding property (i.e., the period of 0) is not included in the response, it is considered to be a malicious signal injection. A limitation of this method has since been found. H Shin et al. demonstrate that PyCRA can be bypassed if the sampling rate and inherent physical delay of a malicious sensor are faster and lower than those of a target sensor [21] . As such, the inherent physical delay is the difference of time between input time (i.e., command to transmit signals) and actual transmitting time.
Since an attacker has the ability to use sensors with better performance than the target, H Shin et al. mention that an attacker could always bypass PyCRA [21] . Recently, though, the authors of PyCRA refuted the method presented in [21] in [30] . Despite this development, PyCRA is still not applicable to ultrasonic sensors because there is a primary limitation due to ultrasonic sensor system. In other words, even if the transmitter is driven to stop transmission of a signal during a period within the duration of triggering, the square pulse (i.e., response) may not include the corresponding property (i.e., there may be no value that becomes zero in all parts of the square pulse). This is due to the ringing time, during which the amplitude of the transmitted signal decreases and eventually the signal comes to a stop, as shown in Figure 1 .
We set the duration of triggering as 800µs, which indicates that the duration of challenge should be chosen within 800µs. The reason why the duration of triggering is set as 800µs is to effectively show both when the square pulse includes the corresponding property and when it does not. If the duration of triggering is short, the corresponding property may not always be included in the square pulse. It is noted that the challenge (i.e. period to driving transmitter to zero) is possible only within the duration of triggering.
First of all, we trigger the transmitter during 300µs, drive to zero during 200µs and trigger it again during 300µs. Since the challenge (i.e., 200µs) is not long enough, the ultrasonic signal is transmitted once more before the amplitude of the transmitted signal sufficiently decreases during the ringing time, and, thus, the amplitude of the echo signal corresponding to the challenge changes only slightly. As a result, the ultrasonic sensor determines that there is a signal injection attack in spite of the normal situation, as there is no the corresponding property in the square pulse, as shown in Figure 12(a) . On the other hand, when the challenge is given a longer duration (i.e., 600µs), the ringing time is not disturbed (i.e., the trigger is not given again during the ringing time), so amplitude of the transmitted signal can sufficiently decrease. Thus, the square pulse corresponding to the challenge is converted to zero, as shown in Figure 12(b) . In some cases, though, responses cannot be verified even if the challenge is long due to a multi-echo phenomenon. When the obstacle is a wide flat wall, the echo signals are reflected continuously, so that they overlapped. Figure 12 (a) and (b) illustrate cases when a multi-echo phenomenon does not occur. On the other hands, Figure 12 (c) demonstrates that the square pulse corresponding to the challenge cannot be converted to zero due to a multi-echo phenomenon, even when the challenge is set to 600µs. We verified this phenomenon through an experiment where the ultrasonic sensor, HG-B40C, was used [6] , and were able to verify the limitation of PyCRA. The analog ultrasonic signals and square pulses were measured by a scope device [17] .
The recently proposed method presented in [22] , which is called PSA, also features a challenge-response structure, but it is an ultrasonic-sensor-specific method that gives a challenge in frequency, amplitude, duration, or phase of ultrasonic signals at random. For example, when the ultrasonic sensor adopts the method of randomizing frequency, it transmits the ultrasonic signal whose frequency was varied at random. From here, the method verifies whether or not the echo signal corresponding to the transmitted signal has the same frequency. However, an oscilloscope and a signal generator are required to change the frequency of the ultrasonic signal, and these devices are highly cost inefficient. The same can be said of the method to randomize the phase of ultrasonic signals. On the other hand, when the amplitude of the ultrasonic signal is randomized and transmitted, an attack is detected by verifying whether the amplitude of the received signal has a linear relation to the amplitude of the previously received echo where linearity was found experimentally. It is assumed that the linearity is maintained because the distance and obstacle of the vehicle cannot be altered largely width within the short time interval when the sensor transmits an ultrasonic signal. Also, in the case in which the duration of ultrasonic signal is changed randomly, the detection method is same as with for the amplitude. However, these methods to randomize the amplitude and duration of ultrasonic signals cannot detect attacks in the conditions where an attack occurs as soon as the vehicle starts. This is because that these methods requires the previous normal values µ are needed to verify the linearity.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented our method for securing ultrasonic sensors against signal injection attacks. Our method verifies the integrity of a received ultrasonic signal based on the aforementioned mathematical model. In the mathematical model, some considerations are made, namely i) how long the ultrasonic sensor is triggered to transmit ultrasonic signals, ii) the measured distance to an obstacle, and iii) the beam pattern of the ultrasonic sensor. We demonstrated that jamming attacks, simple spoofing attacks, and advanced spoofing attacks are detected by our method in dynamic as well as static environments. In addition, we illustrate that our evaluation performs without any additional costly equipment. In conclusion, we expect that our method can be easily applied in real conditions, as it can be applied to ultrasonic sensors without modifying the structural design of an existing environment. 
